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DEATH ON A WHIM: JURY DISCRETION AND "ESPECIALLY
HEINOUS" CRIMES
Maynard v. Cartwright,
486 U.S. 356 (1988)
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether or not the death penalty should be abolished continues to be a sub-
ject of much debate among religious, social, legal, and other circles. However,
since capital punishment has been established as a part of our criminal justice
system, other more technical questions dealing with when and how someone
should be sentenced to death must also be answered.
One such question is which crimes should be punished by this ultimate penalty.
Many states have statutes which set forth certain circumstances for a jury to
consider in making its decision. The statutory provision which seems to raise
the most questions is the one which allows the death penalty to be imposed if
the crime is found to be "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." The United
States Supreme Court dealt with this issue in a case originally from Oklahoma,
Maynard v. Cartwright. 1
Cartwright was convicted of murder in the first degree and shooting with in-
tent to kill. 2 The jury imposed the death penalty for the murder because of
two aggravating circumstances: first, the defendant had "knowingly created a
great risk of death to more than one person," 3 and, second, the murder was
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." 4
After a long appellate process, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 5 limit-
ed to the issue of whether the statute defining an aggravating circumstance as
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" 6 was unconstitutionally vague under
the eighth amendment.
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. Early Considerations of the Jury's Role in Capital Cases
Until recently, the Supreme Court was seldom called upon to settle a ques-
1. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
2. Cartwright v. State, 695 P.2d 548, 550 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 911 (1985);
Cartwright v. State, 708 P.2d 592 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1073 (1986); Cart-
wright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir. 1986); Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir.
1987); cert. granted, 484 U.S. 1003 (1988), aff'd, 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
3. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12(2) (1981).
4. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12(4) (1981).
5. Maynard v. Cartwright, 484 U.S. 1003 (1988).
6. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12(4) (1981).
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tion concerning the eighth amendment. When the question arose, it usually in-
volved whether a certain method of punishment was "cruel and unusual." 7 One
early case involving the death penalty was iFlkerson v. Utah' where the
Supreme Court upheld shooting as a method of execution. The issue seemed
to be more one of the mode of execution than of the death penalty itself. 9
The Supreme Court continued to view the death penalty as falling outside
the eighth amendment, 10 but in McGautha v. California 11 a new issue was
presented. The defendants in this case argued that the jury's having unguided
discretion in imposing the death penalty violated the fourteenth amendment,
which provides that no state shall deprive a person of his life without due process
of law. 12 In his analysis of the case, Justice Harlan described the history of
the jury's role in capital cases to establish the rationale behind allowing juries
discretion in imposing the death sentence 13 and concluded that "[t]his history
reveals continual efforts, uniformly unsuccessful, to identify before the fact those
homicides for which the slayer should die." 14
In colonial America a general sense of rebellion arose against the old common-
law rule which imposed a mandatory death sentence on all persons convicted
of murder. As early as 1794, Pennsylvania abolished capital punishment in all
cases except those of "'murder of the first degree."' 15 Many other states soon
followed. Notwithstanding these legislative attempts to limit somewhat the im-
position of the death penalty, circumstances still arose in which the death penalty
technically applied although the jury believed it inappropriate; as a consequence,
the jury would simply refuse to convict of the capital offense. In an effort to
solve this problem, legislatures, including the United States Congress, did not
try to refine further the definition of capital homicides but instead "adopted the
method of forthrightly granting juries the discretion which they had been exer-
cising in fact." 16 The Supreme Court subsequently approved this policy in Win-
ston v. United States. 17
Another case that the Court in McGautha discussed was Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 18 in which the Supreme Court decided that individuals conscientious-
7. U. S. CONST. amend. VIII. The full text of the eighth amendment reads as follows: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
8. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
9. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 275 (1972) ("[T]he Court concluded: 'Cruel and unusual punish-
ments are forbidden by the Constitution, but the authorities referred to [treatises on military law] are quite
sufficient to show that the punishment of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for the crime
of murder in the first decree [sic] is not included in that category, with the meaning of the [Clause].'" (quot-
ing Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-36 (1878)).
10. See, e.g., In re Kenmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (upholding electrocution as a means of execution).
11. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
12. Id. at 196.
13. Id. at 197-203.
14. Id. at 197.
15. Id. at 198 (quoting Pa. Laws 1794, c. 1777).
16. Id. at 199.
17. 172 U.S. 303 (1899).
18. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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ly against the death penalty could not be automatically excluded from the jury
in a capital case:
[Olne of the most important functions any jury can perform in making such a
selection is to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the
penal system -a link without which the determination of punishment could hard-
ly reflect "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society." 11
Although the Court recognized in McGautha that some "academic and profes-
sional sources" 20 had suggested that standards were needed to guide discre-
tion of capital jury sentencing, it also noted that no court had accepted this
argument 21 and refused to do so itself. The Court stated: "To identify before
the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which
call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which
can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be
tasks which are beyond present human ability." 22 Justice Harlan concluded that
"[iun light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human knowledge,
we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discre-
tion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offen-
sive to anything in the Constitution." 
23
One year later, the Supreme Court made a dramatic change from these state-
ments in its landmark decision of Furman v. Georgia. 24
B. The Beginning of Statutory Standards for the Guidance of Juries
In the 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court was called upon
to decide whether the death penalty was unconstitutional. 25 Although Justices
Brennan and Marshall agreed that the death penalty is unconstitutional per
se, 26 the per curiam opinion in Furman v. Georgia stated only that "the impo-
sition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 27
One of the main concerns of the five concurring Justices 28 was the discrimina-
tory infliction of the death penalty which they reasoned was a result of jury
19. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 202 (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519 n.15 (quoting Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))).
20. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 202.
21. Id. at 202-03.
22. Id. at 204.
23. Id. at 207.
24. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring), 358-59 (Marshall, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 239-40.
28. Justices Brennan, Douglas, Stewart, White, and Marshall wrote concurring opinions. Id. at 257, 240,
306, 310, 314. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist wrote dissenting opin-
ions. Id. at 375, 405, 414, 465.
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discretion. 2 In Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Furman, I he men-
tions the McGautha decision and reasons:
Although the Court's decision in McGautha was technically confined to the dic-
tates of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the
Eighth Amendment as made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it would be disingenuous to suggest that today's
ruling has done anything less than overrule McGautha in the guise of an Eighth
Amendment adjudication. 31
The eighth amendment premise is that the death penalty can "only be imposed
under a system that channels the sentencer's discretion. The aim is to avoid ar-
bitrary, capricious, and discriminatory imposition of the death penalty." 32 The
vagueness doctrine, which prohibits excessively vague statutes, is to be applied
to death penalty procedures to ensure that the due process requirement of the
fourteenth amendment is met. The two principles involved in the vagueness
doctrine are fair notice 33 and the prevention of "arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement of the laws." 
34
The immediate effect of Furman and the other cases decided that same day
and dealing with the same issue 35 was the enactment of new death penalty sta-
tutes in thirty-five states. 36 The idea of writing new statutes to come within
the framework of Furman seems to stem from Chief Justice Burger's dissent:
[I]t is clear that if state legislatures and the Congress wish to maintain the availa-
bility of capital punishment, significant statutory changes will have to be made.
Since the two pivotal concurring opinions turn on the assumption that the punish-
ment of death is now meted out in a random and unpredictable manner, legisla-
tive bodies may seek to bring their laws into compliance with the Court's ruling
by providing standards for juries and judges to follow in determining the sen-
tence in capital cases or by more narrowly defining the crimes for which the penalty
is to be imposed. "I
The new statutes either made the death penalty mandatory for specific categories
29. See Furman, 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring), 295 (Brennan, J., concurring), 310
(Stewart, J., concurring), 314 (White, J., concurring), 365 (Marshall, J. concurring).
30. Id. at 375-405.
31. Id. at 400.
32. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous"Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases - The Standardless Stan-
dard, 64 N.C.L. REV. 941, 946 (1986) [hereinafter The Standardless Standard].
33. Id. at 954 & n.66.
34. Id. at 955.
35. See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845 (1972); and
the other various memorandum decisions in 408 U.S. 932-40. Together with Furman, these cases affected
the imposition of the death penalty in the following states: Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Neva-
da, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, and Washington.
36. Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1484 (10th Cir. 1987).
37. Furman, 408 U.S. at 400.
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of crime or "sought to channel the discretion of the sentencer by requiring separate
guilt and sentencing proceedings, consideration of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, and appellate review of each death sentence." 3 In this second
category, the most criticized of aggravating circumstances is the one that al-
lows a jury to impose the death penalty following its finding that a murder was
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." 39
C. The Supreme Court and the "Especially Heinous" Statutes
In 1976 the Supreme Court held in the case of Gregg v. Georgia 10 that the
statutory system of allowing juries to consider aggravating circumstances was
constitutionally permissible. The Georgia statute considered listed a number
of aggravating circumstances and required the jury to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that at least one of them existed before imposing the death
penalty. 41Included in the statute was the aggravating circumstance that "[t]he
offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind,
or an aggravated battery to the victim." 4 2 Since the question in Gregg was
whether or not Georgia's entire statutory scheme was constitutional and since
the jury had not used the "outrageously or wantonly vile" aggravating circum-
stance to impose the death penalty, the Supreme Court did not extensively deal
with this section of the statute. 43 The Court did acknowledge that it was "ar-
guable that any murder involves depravity of mind or an aggravated bat-
tery."44 The Court continued, "But this language need not be construed in this
way, and there is no reason to assume that the Supreme Court of Georgia will
"145adopt such an open-ended construction.
On the same day that the Gregg decision was handed down, the Court decid-
ed Proffitt v. Florida, 4 which also involved an aggravating circumstance statu-
tory system. The jury in this case had actually relied on the "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" statute4 7 to advise the judge to impose the death
penalty. 48 Florida used aggravating circumstances in a method slightly differ-
ent from Georgia's: the jury was to look at all statutory mitigating and aggravat-
ing circumstances and weigh them against each other in its determination of
whether or not to advise the judge to impose capital punishment. 49 The Supreme
38. Cartwright, 822 F.2d at 1484.
39. The Standardless Standard, supra note 32, at 943-45. Variations of this wording include "outrageously
or wantonly vile," "heinous," "horrible," "brutal," "depraved," "cruel," "inhuman," and "atrocious." Id. at
943 n.7.
40. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
41. Id. at 196-97.
42. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534. l(b)(7) (Supp. 1975).
43. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 201 n.51.
44. Id. at 201.
45. Id.
46. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
47. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(h) (West Supp. 1976-1977).
48. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 246.
49. Id. at 248-51.
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Court indicated that since Florida had narrowly construed the "especially heinous"
statute as being "directed only at 'the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is
unnecessarily torturous to the victim,"' 5 0 it "[could not] say that the provision,
as so construed, provide[d] inadequate guidance to those charged with the duty
of recommending or imposing sentences in capital cases." 51
Thus, in 1976, the Supreme Court indicated that "especially heinous" sta-
tutes were not unconstitutionally vague if the state judiciary interpreted them
in such a way as not to allow every form of murder to fall within the statute.
Only four years later, Georgia's "outrageously or wantonly vile" provision 52
was again brought to the attention of the Supreme Court in Godfrey v. Geor-
gia. 53 The petitioner in this case had gone to his mother-in-law's trailer where
his estranged wife was living. Looking through a window, he saw his wife,
mother-in-law, and eleven-year-old daughter inside playing cards. Aiming
through the window, he shot his wife in the forehead, killing her instantly. He
then went inside the trailer, hit his fleeing daughter with the barrel of the shot-
gun, and shot his mother-in-law in the head, killing her instantly. 5
Godfrey immediately called the sheriffs office and turned himself in. He later
told the police that he had committed a "'hideous crime"' but that he had been
"'thinking about it for eight years"' and would "'do it again.'" 5 5 He was con-
victed on two counts of murder and one count of aggravated assault. 56 The
jury imposed the death penalty on the basis of the "outrageously or wantonly
vile" provision. 57 The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the defendant's vague-
ness challenge and upheld the sentence by relying on Gregg v. Georgia 58 and
its own past decisions. The court stated only that the jury's finding was sup-
ported by the evidence and that the language of the finding "'was not objection-
able."' "1
In writing the opinion for Godfrey, Justice Stewart noted that the provision
had not been held unconstitutional in Gregg 6 0 but that the Supreme Court had
based this ruling on the assumption that the Georgia courts would continue to
apply a narrow construction to the provision. 61 The issue in Godfrey was
"whether, in affirming the imposition of the sentences of death in the present
case, the Georgia Supreme Court ha[d] adopted such a broad and vague con-
struction of the § (b)(7) aggravating circumstance as to violate the Eighth and
50. Id. at 255 (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (1973)).
51. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255-56 (emphasis added).
52. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (Supp. 1975).
53. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
54. Id. at 425.
55. Id. at 425-26.
56. Id. at 426.
57. Id.
58. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that Georgia's death penalty statutes were constitutional).
59. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 427 (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 243 Ga. 302, 310, 253 S.E.2d 710, 718 (1979)).
60. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
61. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 422-23.
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Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution."62
After briefly noting that all of the other aggravating circumstances in the
Georgia statute were "considerably more specific or objectively measura-
ble," 63 the Court addressed the "outrageously or wantonly vile" provision. It
reiterated that "if a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a con-
stitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the
arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty." 6 The Court cited Gregg
v. Georgia 65 as authority for requiring "'clear and objective standards'" 66 as
guidance for juries in the imposition of the death penalty. 67 The Court found
the application of the statute in this case to be an insufficient channeling of the
discretion of the jury since "[a] person of ordinary sensibility could fairly charac-
terize almost every murder as 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and
inhuman' "18 and since judicial review had not corrected the problem. 61
In the past the Georgia Supreme Court had interpreted the statute more nar-
rowly than it did in Godfrey; three conclusions concerning the statute's aggravat-
ing circumstances had been applied:
The first was that the evidence that the offense was 'outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhuman' had to demonstrate 'torture, depravity of mind, or an
aggravated battery to the victim.' The second was that the phrase, 'depravity of
mind,' comprehended only the kind of mental state that led the murderer to tor-
ture or to commit an aggravated battery before killing his victim. The third...
was that the word, 'torture,' must be construed in pari materia with 'aggravated
battery' so as to require evidence of serious physical abuse of the victim before
death. 70
The Supreme Court found that the offense in Godfrey did not meet any of these
criteria and, thus, that the Georgia Supreme Court had not "applied a constitu-
tional construction of the [provision]." 71 Accordingly, the Court reversed the
death sentence in this case. 72
As can be seen in the Cartwright case, 73 problems remain with application
of the "especially heinous" provisions to capital cases. State courts are still not
applying a narrow enough construction to "especially heinous" statutes to meet
constitutionally mandated guidelines.
62. Id. at 423.
63. Id. at 423 n.2.
64. Id. at 428.
65. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
66. Id. at 198 (quoting Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974)).
67. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428.
68. Id. at 428-29.
69. Id. at 429.
70. Id. at 431.
71. Id. at 432-33.
72. Id. at 433.
73. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
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III. INSTANT CASE
A rTi "f 74
In July, 1981, Thomas Cartwright began working for Hugh and Charma Riddle
in their remodeling business in Muskogee, Oklahoma. In December of the same
year, he was fired from the job. Cartwright claimed that the Riddles fired him
because they did not want to pay for an injury which he allegedly received while
working for them. The Riddles said he was laid off for lack of business. Dur-
ing the following year, Cartwright told an acquaintance "that he intended to
'get even' with the Riddles." 75
On May 3, 1982, the Riddles spent the night with Charma's father. They
returned to their rural home sometime during the early evening on May 4. Af-
ter eating a meal, they went into the living room to watch television. During
the evening, Charma left the living room and was on her way to the bathroom
when she encountered a man in her hallway holding a shotgun in his hands.
When she grabbed the gun, the man fired into her leg. After falling to the floor,
she looked up and recognized her attacker as their ex-employee, Thomas Cart-
wright. He then shot her again.
Charma watched as Cartwright entered the living room and fired twice with
the shotgun; she heard the screams of her husband, Hugh, who was killed almost
instantly. After Cartwright disappeared into the living room, Charma managed
to drag herself down the hall and into a bedroom. She tried to use the telephone
but found that it was dead, so she began to write Cartwright's name on the bed-
sheet in her own blood. She had managed to write the letters "TOM CAR" when
Cartwright entered the room and found her. When Charma asked why he had
shot them, he answered that they should not have fired him. Charma asked him
to help her, but he stabbed her twice, once in the throat, with a hunting knife
the Riddles had given him for Christmas. He then left the room.
Charma heard the phone ring in another room and realized that the phone
in the bedroom was only unplugged. After plugging it back in, she called the
operator, who connected her with the Muskogee police. She informed the dis-
patcher that she had been shot by Tom Cartwright and that he was still in the
house. She then gave him directions to her home.
Cartwright was fleeing from the house when the police arrived, and he managed
to escape at that time. 76 The police took Mrs. Riddle to the Muskogee Hospi-
tal, and she lived to testify against Cartwright at his trial.
The jury found Cartwright guilty of both murder in the first degree and shooting
74. The facts of this case are taken from the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma,
Cartwright v. State, 695 P.2d 548, 550-51 (1985). A summary of facts can also be found in any of the appel-
late opinions listed in supra note 2.
75. Cartwright, 695 P.2d at 550.
76. He was arrested two days later. Id. at 551.
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with intent to kill and sentenced him to death for the murder and seventy-five
years' imprisonment for the shooting.
B. The Appellate Decisions
On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, the defendant raised
several issues, 77 but it was the review of the death penalty which eventually
merited discussion by the Supreme Court. 78
The jury had imposed the death penalty after finding that two aggravating
circumstances existed: first, that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious
or cruel" and, second, that the defendant had "knowingly created a risk of death
to more than one person .7 In Oklahoma the sentencer is required to balance
all the aggravating circumstances with all the mitigating circumstances in mak-
ing its determination of the sentence. 80 On appeal, Cartwright argued It that
since Hugh Riddle had died almost instantly, the murder was not torturous and
thus not especially heinous under the principle of Godfrey v. Georgia. 82
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma stated that in Godfrey the Georgia
Supreme Court before Godfrey had always required some form of torture; 83 no
torture was involved in the Godfrey case, but the Georgia Supreme Court up-
held a finding that the murders were "outrageously wanton or vile" anyway.
Thus, the court seemed to be saying that it was the sudden change in the in-
terpretation of the statute in Godfrey that was unconstitutional, not that no tor-
ture was involved. The court went on to say that Oklahoma had never defined
their "especially heinous" provision in such a way. 84 Oklahoma had defined
"heinous" as "extremely wicked or shockingly evil." 85 The court cited several
cases in which the "especially heinous" provision had applied even though tor-
ture had not been involved. 86 Therefore, the court of criminal appeals upheld
the death sentence by saying that the circumstances surrounding the murder
supported the jury's finding that it was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel,"
that the defendant had "created a great risk of death to more than one person,"
and that the death penalty was not "excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
77. Id. at 550-51.
78. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
79. Cartwright, 695 P.2d at 553.
80. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1983).
81. Cartwright, 695 P.2d at 553-54.
82. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
83. Cartwright, 695 P.2d at 554.
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159, 1168 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (quoting State v. Dix-
on, 283 So. 2d I (Fla. 1973))).
86. Davis v. State, 665 P.2d 1186 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); Boutwell v. State, 659 P.2d 322 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1983); Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d
1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980); Chaney v. State, 612 P.2d 269 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (all cited in Cart-
wright, 695 P.2d at 554).
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imposed in similar cases.""7
The Supreme Court denied certiorari, 88 and the state court denied an appli-
cation for post-conviction relief89 for which the Supreme Court again denied
certiorari. 90 The defendant then appealed to the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Oklahoma for a writ of habeas corpus and was de-
nied. 91 A panel from the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial 92 but granted a re-
hearing en banc on the question of the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"
aggravating circumstance. 93
The Tenth Circuit stated the issues as follows:
First, we must decide whether reliance upon an unconstitutionally vague or over-
broad statutory aggravating circumstance requires the reversal of a death sen-
tence where the sentencer was required to balance the aggravating circumstances
with the mitigating circumstances. Second, if such reliance requires that the death
sentence be vacated, we must then decide whether the Oklahoma courts in this
case applied a constitutionally adequate narrowing construction of 'especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel' to the facts of this case. Finally, if the state courts
failed to apply a proper narrowing construction, we must decide whether this
court can apply a narrowing construction of 'especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel' to the facts of this case. 94
Regarding the first issue, the Tenth Circuit considered the fact that Oklaho-
ma uses a balancing of all mitigating and aggravating circumstances to deter-
mine whether to apply the death penalty. If one of the factors were found to
be invalid on appeal, the Oklahoma courts would not reweigh the balancing
factors without the invalid factor but would simply modify the death penalty
to life imprisonment. Thus, the court decided that if it found the "especially
87. Cartwright, 695 P.2d at 554-55. In discussing what made the crime "especially heinous," the court
stated the following:
We deem it proper to gauge whether the murder was heinous, atrocious or cruel in light of the cir-
cumstances attendant to the murder, including the evidence that the appellant had previously expressed
his intentions to 'get even' with the Riddles; that he probably had been inside the Riddles' home as
early as 11: 13 a.m. on the day of the murder; that he either lay in wait for them, or returned under
the cover of darkness, and broke into their home to stalk them; that he attacked Charma immediately
upon being discovered; that having gunned her down, he went into the living room and slayed Hugh;
that Hugh doubtless heard the shotgun blasts which tore through Charma's body, that he quite possi-
bly experienced a moment of terror as he was confronted by the appellant and realized his impending
doom; that the appellant again attempted to kill Charma in a brutal fashion upon discovery that his
first attempt was unsuccessful; that he attempted to conceal his deeds by disconnecting the telephone
and posting a note on the door [which stated that the Riddles were out of town, Id. at 55 1]; and that
his apparent attempt to steal goods belonging to the Riddles by loading them in their vehicle was
prevented only by the arrival of police officers, adequately supported the jury's finding.
Id. at 554.
88. 473 U.S. 911 (1985).
89. Cartwright v. State, 708 P.2d 592 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985).
90. 474 U.S. 1973 (1986).
91. Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1478 (10th Cir. 1987).
92. Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir. 1986).
93. Cartwright, 822 F.2d at 1478.
94. Id.
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heinous" provision to be constitutionally invalid, it would have to vacate the
death sentence. 95
In making its determination, the circuit court reviewed the Supreme Court
decisions involving similar challenges 96 and stated that "[t]he narrowing func-
tion of an aggravating circumstance demands that such a factor be capable of
objective determination." 97 After noting that twenty-three other states had similar
statutes, the court went on to say that, while the Supreme Court had not held
any of them to be facially unconstitutional, it went beyond the face of the sta-
tute and "'probed the application of statutes to particular cases.' 9 8 If a state
court interprets the aggravating circumstance broadly, "'it may ...vitiate[]
the role of the aggravating circumstance in guiding the sentencing jury's dis-
cretion.'" 99
The Tenth Circuit then looked at the role that the "especially heinous" statute
had played in past Oklahoma decisions 10 and found that, while Oklahoma pur-
ported to follow the narrowing construction approved by the Supreme Court
in Proffitt v. Florida, 101 Oklahoma courts had never said that the language used
in Proffitt, "unnecessarily torturous to the victim," was mandatory and had even
"'[made] clear that suffering of the victim is not the major factor . .."' 102 but
that the "'manner of the killing"' and the surrounding circumstances are also
relevant. 103
After a comparison with Godfrey v. Georgia, 104 the court restated the defi-
nitions of the "especially heinous" statute that the court had given in the jury
instructions in Cartwright's trial. The judge had stated: "'[T]he term 'heinous'
means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; 'atrocious' means outrageously
wicked and vile; 'cruel' means pitiless, or designed to inflict a high degree of
pain, utter indifference to, or enjoyment of, the sufferings of the others.'" 06 The
circuit court decided that since the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had
stated that the statute is disjunctive - heinous, atrocious, or cruel - the jury could
have determined that the death penalty could be imposed under only one of the
three definitions. 106 The Tenth Circuit held that this was as arbitrary and capri-
cious as the statute in Godfrey and failed for the same reasons -these defini-
tions could be used to describe any murder and thus were not narrow enough
95. Id. at 1483.
96. See supra notes 40-72 and accompanying text.
97. Cartwright, 822 F.2d at 1485.
98. Id. (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304-05 (1987)).
99. Cartwright, 822 F.2d at 1485-86 (quoting McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 305).
100. Cartwright, 822 F.2d at 1487-91.
101. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
102. Cartwright, 822 F.2d at 1488 (quoting Nuckols v. State, 690 P.2d 463, 472 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984)).
103. Cartwright, 822 F.2d at 1488 (quoting Nuckols, 690 P.2d at 472).
104. 466 U.S. 420 (1980).
105. Cartwright, 822 F.2d at 1488.
106. Id.
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to avoid "arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence." 10 7 Put another
way, "vague terms do not suddenly become clear when they are defined by refer-
ence to other vague terms." 108
The Court of Appeals continued:
The Oklahoma court has never explained why one manner of killing is 'especial-
ly heinous, atrocious, or cruel' and why another manner of killing is not. The
cases in which the court has found the manner of the killing to support this ag-
gravating circumstance do not reveal any pattern or consistency in the way in
which the murder was committed . . . . Therefore, the court's reliance upon the
manner of the killing does not serve to distinguish among those murders that are
punishable by death and those that are not. 109
The court accordingly held that "the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals failed
to apply a constitutionally required narrowing construction of 'especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel' in this case." 110
Because of the inconsistencies of the Oklahoma decisions applying the "es-
pecially heinous" statute, the Tenth Circuit decided that "there [was] no con-
stitutionally adequate narrowing construction adopted by the state courts that
[it could] apply to the instant case." "' As a result it enjoined the execution
of Cartwright but stated that the "judgment [was] without prejudice to further
proceedings by the state for redetermination of the sentence." 1 2
C. The Supreme Court Opinion
On June 6, 1988, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the Tenth Circuit. 113 On appeal the State argued that there are some "factual
circumstances that so plainly characterize the killing as 'especially heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel' that affirmance of the death penalty is proper." " The Supreme
Court interpreted this argument as saying that "a statutory provision governing
a criminal case is unconstitutionally vague only if there are no circumstances
that could be said with reasonable certainty to fall within reach of the language
at issue." 1I5 In other words, the State was arguing "that if there are circum-
stances that any reasonable person would recognize as covered by the statute,
it is not unconstitutionally vague even if the language would fail to give ade-
quate notice that it covered other circumstances as well." 116
The Supreme Court said that this reasoning is only applicable under the due
process clause vagueness doctrine and "fails to recognize the rationale of our
107. Id. at 1489.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1490.
110. Id. at 1491.
111. Id. at 1492.
112. Id.
113. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 366 (1988).
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cases construing and applying the Eighth Amendment." 117 The Court further
stated:
Claims of vagueness directed at aggravating circumstances defined in capital
punishment statutes are analyzed under the Eighth Amendment and characteristi-
cally assert that the challenged provision fails adequately to inform juries what
they must find to impose the death penalty and as a result leaves them and appel-
late courts with the kind of open-ended discretion which was held invalid in Furman
v. Georgia. 118
The Court held that the circuit court was "quite right in holding that Godfrey
controls this case" 19 since the language in this statute gives no more guidance
to the jury than the language in Godfrey 120 and that the Oklahoma court's con-
clusion that the circumstances "'adequately supported the jury's findings'" 121 did
no more to "cure the unfettered discretion of the jury ...to satisfy the com-
mands of the Eighth Amendment" 12 2 than the Georgia court's analysis had.
The Supreme Court refused to agree with the state that the Tenth Circuit re-
quired that for the "especially heinous" statute to be valid "torture or serious
physical abuse" must be present 123 and stated that "[wie also do not hold that
some kind of torture or serious physical abuse is the only limiting construction
of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance that would be con-
stitutionally acceptable." 124
Since at the time Cartwright was sentenced, Oklahoma did not try to uphold
a death penalty where one of the aggravating circumstances was found to be
invalid even if the others were valid, the State's argument that the death penalty
should stand because another aggravating circumstance had been found was held
to be without merit. Taking notice of Stouffer v. State, 125 in which the Court
of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma held "that it would not necessarily set aside
a death penalty where on appeal one of several aggravating circumstances has
been found invalid or unsupported by the evidence," 126 the Supreme Court held
that its judgment affirming the court of appeals, and thus vacating Cartwright's
death sentence, was "without prejudice to further proceedings in the state courts
for redetermination of the appropriate sentence." 127
117. Id.
118. Id. at 361-62 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
119. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363.
120. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
121. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 364 (quoting Cartwright, 695 P.2d at 554).
122. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 364.
123. Id. at 364-65.
124. Id. at 365.
125. 742 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987).
126. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 365 (citing Stouffer, 742 P.2d at 564)).
127. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 365-66. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma subsequently decided
not to modify Cartwright's death penalty to a life sentence as in its past practice but remanded the case to
Muskogee County District Court for resentencing. See Cartwright v. State, 778 P.2d 479 (Okla. Crim. App.
1989).
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IV. ANALYSIS
Oklahoma is not the only state which has had problems with interpreting the
"especially heinous" provision of its aggravating circumstances. 128 Although
the Supreme Court states that "some kind of torture or serious physical abuse
is [not] the only limiting construction of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel ag-
gravating circumstance that would be constitutionally acceptable," 129 it is difficult
to imagine any other circumstance that it would uphold given its record. This
decision does little more than reiterate the holding in Godfrey v. Georgia. 130 The
instant case shows that the decision in Godfrey solved few problems.
The difficulty appears to be in the statutes themselves. The very words used
are subjective, so how can one follow objective standards which are required
by the Supreme Court's decision in Gregg? 
13 1
The Supreme Court, by requiring exact and specific situations for the impo-
sition of the death penalty by the jury, had already effectively blocked any path
which the wishes of the people could follow except through the representative
body of the legislature. The legislature in enacting the "especially heinous" sta-
tutes supposedly was following public opinion. It is likely that such provisions
were intended as a "catch all" to encompass those situations which the more
specific aggravating circumstances would not cover and yet in which general
sentiment would be that the death penalty should be applied. The Supreme Court's
requirement of some method of "channeling and limiting . . . the sentencer's
discretion" 132 has subverted the actual purpose of the "especially heinous" pro-
visions.
Although one author has questioned the judiciary's power to circumvent the
authority of the people and has even suggested that the Court's actions are un-
constitutional, 133 the decisions have been made; the question is what states can
or should do to conform to Supreme Court standards.
A. Legislative Action
Perhaps the simplest approach to abolishing any possible confusion in the
interpretation of the "especially heinous" provisions would be to repeal them
and to draft more objective and specific provisions to replace them. '1 A legis-
lature could consider all the prior cases in its jurisdiction involving the "espe-
cially heinous" statute to find a specific pattern of what were considered to be
especially heinous crimes - the best example being murder involving torture - and
128. For a thorough discussion of different states' applications of "especially heinous" statutes and the
inconsistencies in their application, see The Standardless Standard, supra note 32.
129. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 365.
130. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
131. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
132. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362.
133. R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 156 (1982).
134. This is the solution supported by Professor Rosen in his article, The Standardless Standard, supra
note 32, at 989-92.
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draft the provision accordingly. Should no pattern be found, the legislature would
understand why the statutes could be considered "arbitrary and capricious." 135
In drafting the new provisions, legislators should also consider the narrow
constructions of the "especially heinous" aggravating circumstance which have
been upheld by the Supreme Court. One good example is that of Georgia be-
fore Godfrey. 136 The courts in Georgia had interpreted their "outrageously or
wantonly vile" statute to mean "'torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated
battery to the Victim." 137 The Florida courts' construction of a "'conscience-
less or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous' 138 was also upheld. 139
In light of the above decisions, one possible replacement provision would
be to require that the crime involve depravity of mind as evidenced by mental
or physical torture to the victim before death. Such a provision should be suffi-
cient to "adequately . . . inform juries what they must find to impose the death
penalty." 140
B. Judicial Construction
If legislatures will not take action to remove the "especially heinous" provi-
sions from the capital sentencing statutes, the courts will be forced to interpret
the meaning of the statutes and to remain within narrow interpretations. Courts
continue to fail in this endeavor. 141 Not only do interpretations differ among
states, but interpretations have not been consistent from case to case within the
same court. 142 This failure to follow consistently a stated standard is the problem
with the "especially heinous" provisions. No one seems to be able to find a defi-
nition of the statute to which the courts are willing to adhere; cases still arise
in which neither the trial judge, jury, nor appellate courts can rationally show
why the "especially heinous" statute should apply based on prior decisions, but
in which the circumstances of the case seem to merit the provisions' application.
However, in Maynard v. Cartwright, 143 the Supreme Court once again pointed
out that the only way the "especially heinous" statutes will be constitutionally
permissible is for the state courts to limit their construction. Courts need to
set a standard for what will be considered heinous in their jurisdictions and then
stay within the boundaries of their decisions. One cannot be adequately informed
of the consequences of his actions as required by the fourteenth amendment
if courts continue to uphold jury findings that a crime was "especially heinous"
with no specific definitions of the terms.
135. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362.
136. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
137. Id. at 431.
138. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255 (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (1973)).
139. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 256.
140. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361-62.
141. See The Standardless Standard, supra note 32.
142. Id.
143. 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
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C. Supreme Court Response
Should all else fail and too much discretion still be allowed juries, the Supreme
Court may eventually need to declare the "especially heinous" statutes uncon-
stitutional. Past Supreme Court decisions, beginning with Furman, 144 have
already paved the way for such an action.
In Furman, the Court declared the death penalty unconstitutional because the
existing statutes allowed juries to inflict the death penalty arbitrarily, thus violating
both the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 145 The Court later upheld the "es-
pecially heinous" provisions with the understanding that the state courts would
limit their construction so as to channel a jury's discretion within constitutional
means. 146 In Godfrey v. Georgia, 147 and now Maynard v. Cartwright, 148 while
not declaring the statutes unconstitutional, the Court did hold that the actual
application of the statutes can be unconstitutional. In light of these decisions,
if inconsistencies continue to prevail among the courts, the Supreme Court would
have a strong foundation upon which to base its decision to declare "especially
heinous" statutes and their variations unconstitutional under both the eighth and
fourteenth amendments.
V. CONCLUSION
Though Godfrey 14 9 should have settled the question as to "especially heinous"
provisions, Maynard v. Cartwright 150 proves that it did not. Perhaps this de-
cision will cause legislatures to take a closer look at the statutes and courts to
consider more carefully whether their own interpretations of the "especially
heinous" provisions are following constitutional standards. Unfortunately, since
Godfrey solved few problems, the possibility remains that state courts will con-
tinue to justify their inconsistent applications of the provisions, thereby forcing
the Supreme Court to decide on the constitutionality of the statutes themselves.
It remains to be seen what effect this latest decision will have on the fate of
those who commit what the jury considers to be an "especially heinous" crime.
Rebecca L. Wiggins
144. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
145. Id. at 240.
146. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 201 & n.51 (Although "[iut is, of course, arguable that any murder involves depravity
of mind or an aggravated battery . . .there is no reason to assume that the Supreme Court of Georgia will
adopt such an open-ended construction."); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255-56 ("We cannot say that the provision,
as so construed, provides inadequate guidance to those charged with the duty of recommending or imposing
sentences in capital cases." (emphasis added)).
147. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
148. 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
149. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
150. 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
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